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Abstract:  Zentall’s thoughtful review of the literature on cognitive dissonance in nonhumans 
helps to highlight the common finding that similar outcomes in humans and nonhumans can be 
attributed to different underlying mechanisms. I advocate a more fully comparative approach to 
the underlying mechanisms, avoiding the assumption of shared processes in humans and 
nonhumans. 
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Zentall (2016) has written an excellent review of the debate regarding apparent cognitive 
dissonance in nonhumans. These effects – e.g., altered preferences for items or rewards after 
differential choice or effort – have been attributed to the need to resolve inconsistencies 
between one’s beliefs and behaviors or between one’s beliefs. Research on nonhuman animals 
suggests that such effects may arise from processes that are not under conscious control. For 
example, Zentall attributes similar preferences – for rewards or cues of reward that follow 
greater effort, or otherwise more aversive events – to what he terms “within-trial contrast 
effects.” Zentall’s target article reveals a very clever experimental approach to uncovering the 
mechanisms responsible for apparent dissonance-based decisions and preferences in 
nonhumans. In the studies he reviews, researchers have carefully controlled for time between 
actions and reward, arousal at the time of reward and so on, allowing them greater confidence 
in attributing preferences to the contrast between the aversive event and the subsequent 
reward. I have no issues with the experiments as conducted, or with the logic of the 
interpretation of their results. However, the discussion does lead me to reflect on the following 
observations. 
First, it strikes me that there is an unexplored potential link between cognitive 
dissonance, as defined in humans, and the capacity for metacognition. Nonhuman animals 
presumably do not experience the full suite of metacognitive abilities (Smith, Coutinho, Boomer, 
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& Beran, 2012); yet, there is good evidence that at least some species are aware of their own 
memory processes. Such evidence has been presented in dolphins, nonhuman primates, and in 
rats, but, to my knowledge, there is no convincing evidence yet for metacognitive processes in 
pigeons (for review see Smith, 2009, although see Castro & Wasserman, 2013). Pigeons do, 
however, reveal the same apparent dissonance effects. The presence of dissonance effects in 
animals without clear metacognition appears to support Zentall’s claims that such effects can be 
attributed to simpler mechanisms that do not rest upon concerns with social judgments. 
Furthermore, the fact, noted by Zentall, that humans are not always aware of the association 
between effort and the cue that follows it suggests that, even in humans the effects do not arise 
from a conscious evaluative process. 
Another strategy for linking dissonance effects to other cognitive phenomena would be 
to study dissonance effects in populations with autism. Although I am not aware of any 
literature that supports this assumption, individuals with autism would presumably fail to show 
the same kind of concern with presenting consistent beliefs and attitudes to their peers. This is 
because they exhibit deficits in reasoning about the thoughts and beliefs of others, and thus 
would have reduced motivation to alter their behavior to appear more consistent to others. 
Thus, they might be expected to show similar contrast effects without the subsequent need to 
justify that behavior. 
Similar effects across species do not necessarily imply similar underlying mechanisms. I 
do not believe that Zentall makes this common mistake. But to argue that dissonance effects in 
humans are not due to the desire to rectify perceived inconsistencies on the grounds that 
animals show similar effects in the absence of self-evaluative processes would be to neglect the 
possibility that animals engage in behaviors similar to those of humans for very different 
underlying reasons. For example, humans may prefer to make visual gestures to other humans 
who they know can see them. Chimpanzees too may gesture to others who can see their 
gesture, but this strategy may be due to a learned association between the visibility of another’s 
eyes and their responsiveness to requests rather than to an understanding of “seeing” (Povinelli 
& Vonk, 2004). This is not to say that researchers should abandon studying similar behaviors 
across species to elucidate underlying mechanisms. Such an approach can certainly clarify which 
abilities are necessary and sufficient for the expression of specific behaviors and cognitions. For 
example, it is clear that language and perhaps metacognitive abilities are unnecessary for shifts 
in preferences among cues that signal identical rewards after differential effort. However, 
dissonance effects in humans may well arise precisely because of our unique capacity to reflect 
upon our own (sometimes conflicting) beliefs and behaviors. 
Zentall’s review highlights some other intriguing aspects of the work on dissonance in 
nonhumans. It is puzzling that animals would prefer a cue that signaled the lack of food. This is 
worth exploring in greater detail. Associationist theories cannot account fully for such a pattern 
of results unless the association between the animal’s state of arousal and the cue takes 
precedence over the association between the cue and the reward (or lack thereof). However, 
Clement and Zentall (2002) showed that differential arousal is not necessary to obtain contrast 
effects. It is therefore possible that differential desire rather than differential arousal explains 
some of the effects. For example, individuals that work harder or anticipate having to work 
harder (whether through cognitive or physical effort) find food more desirable. This parallels the 
somewhat controversial research on glucose depletion where even cognitive effort requires 
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glucose (Miller, 2012). That is, the reward itself, or the cue that signals it, may become more 
appealing when one has depleted more energy. I am not convinced that the control for arousal 
or physical effort at the time of choice necessarily accounts for this. Zentall describes some work 
showing that animals prefer stimuli associated with food under conditions when they were food 
deprived over stimuli associated with food under conditions when they were less food deprived; 
they maintain such preferences under identical conditions of deprivation (Marsh, Schuck-Paim, 
& Kacelnik, 2004). Perhaps once the animal is sated, the cue associated with food is associated 
with lack of desire rather than with the intense need state that is still experienced when food is 
not present. 
Animals have sometimes been reported to behave more optimistically under conditions 
when they anticipated but did not receive a reward in cognitive bias paradigms (Burman et al., 
2011; Briefer Freymond et al., 2014). In nonhumans, cognitive bias is often assessed by 
presenting animals with a pair of cues; one signals reward and the other signals lack of reward 
or an aversive outcome (Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004). Once animals have learned the different 
outcomes associated with each cue, they are presented with ambiguous stimuli, which typically 
fall along intermediate values of a spatial or perceptual continuum. Animals are assessed for 
their response to the ambiguous stimuli, which is then compared to their previously trained 
responses to the reward and nonreward cues. If they respond to ambiguous cues as if they are 
anticipating reward, the animals are deemed to be behaving optimistically. Studies of cognitive 
bias in nonhumans are useful from a welfare perspective, as they can indicate what events or 
stimuli may cause animals to behave pessimistically or optimistically. However, they have often 
yielded contradictory or confusing patterns of results (McGuire, Vonk, Fuller, & Allard, 2017). If 
the nonreward outcome ends up being more valued due to a greater contrast between the 
effort to access that cue and the end result, animals may appear to behave pessimistically when 
it is predicted that they will be optimistic. Perdue (2017) has recently shown that, in the absence 
of any manipulation intended to influence underlying affect, animals tend to respond to 
intermediate stimuli the way they respond to the nonrewarded stimulus over repeated 
exposure. These preferences reverse when reward contingencies are reversed – an effect that 
Perdue attributes to contrast effects rather than to shifts in underlying biases, drawing another 
interesting parallel with the work on dissonance. 
Zentall suggests that the very presence of contrast effects implies a form of relational 
learning. I would like to see his thinking on this point further articulated. It is known that some 
apes implicitly recognize the relations between sets of objects (Vonk, 2003). Many species can 
understand a single relation (e.g., sameness, difference), but fewer species appear capable of 
second-order relations in which they understand that the relationship between two objects or 
events is the same as the one between two other objects or events. Some authors have argued 
that relational knowledge is a key cognitive trait separating humans from nonhumans (Penn, 
Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008). Thus, the type of relational knowledge assumed to underlie 
cognitive dissonance effects needs further elaboration. 
In addition to the tendency to preferentially value rewards that one has worked harder 
to obtain, individuals demonstrate dissonance by devaluing rewards they have previously 
rejected in a forced choice (Brehm, 1956). The adaptive function of a tendency to devalue items 
that have previously not been chosen may be easier to understand in humans than in 
nonhumans. For example, once humans detect their own inconsistency, they may try to resolve 
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it because inconsistency introduces undesirable unpredictability in a social setting. Thus, the 
bias may be adaptive in modulating social relations. However, one must be careful to avoid 
conflating current function with the original function that allowed a trait to evolve in a 
population. It is not clear what evolutionary pressures would select for the bias in such a broad 
range of species. Zentall’s within-trial contrast model suggests that such biases would 
encourage animals to work harder to obtain rewards, perhaps when there is a greater risk under 
conditions of limited or risky resources. There is also the possibility that the bias was not 
selected for but a natural byproduct of the relationship between exertion and reward. This 
explanation is not as clear where there is denigration of previously unselected rewards, 
however.  
West, Jett, Beckman, and Vonk (2010) used the “spreading of alternatives” paradigm to 
assess changes in animals’ preferences for rewards formerly valued similarly after one of the 
options was not chosen on a previous trial. They found that only monkeys, but not psitaccines or 
bears, selected the previously unchosen option less often on a final trial. This is consistent with 
the idea that they devalued the option they had not selected. However, chimpanzees also failed 
to show a pattern consistent with dissonance. Despite this anomaly, we argued that perhaps 
this form of dissonance evolved in the primate lineage, especially given similar results in 
monkeys reported by Egan, Santos, and Bloom (2007). Chen and Risen (2009) criticized the Egan 
et al. (2007) study, suggesting that similar response times to retrieve the rewards are not 
necessarily indicative of equivalent preferences. However, West et al. (2010) used the number 
of choices of each item rather than response times to establish equivalent preference rates. As 
far as I’m aware, this the only study to examine apparent dissonance effects in several distantly 
related species using exactly the same task. A broad comparative approach might be useful in 
determining the extent to which similar mechanisms underlie similar behaviors.  
Rather than questioning Zentall’s approach to the study of cognitive dissonance, or his 
interpretation of the results of such studies, I hope I have highlighted a few directions in which 
the current research could be extended for a better understanding of the mechanisms 
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